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 Feminist Pragmatism in the Work of 
Justice Bertha Wilson 
Colleen Sheppard* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Inspired by a commitment to promoting equality and to deciding 
individual cases, Justice Bertha Wilson’s ideas resonate with feminist 
pragmatism. While pragmatist thought has long-standing historical roots 
in American philosophical traditions, it is only recently that the feminist 
dimensions of pragmatism have been acknowledged and explored.1 Justice 
Wilson’s pragmatism was reflected in her approach to legal interpretation 
— an approach based upon the centrality of social context and experiential 
knowledge rather than abstract legal formalism. She endeavoured to 
ensure that her judicial decisions regarding immediate legal disputes 
contributed to advancing social justice, despite her understanding that 
there were often no ideal solutions and recognition of significant 
constraints linked to broader patterns of systemic and intergenerational 
inequity. Yet pragmatism alone does not fully explain Justice Wilson’s 
judicial philosophy. Her sensitivity to women’s rights and her willingness 
to listen to the voices of those historically excluded from defining the law 
are consistent with important aspects of feminist legal theory.2  
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1
 See Margaret Jane Radin, “The Pragmatist and the Feminist” (1990) 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
1699 [hereinafter “‘The Pragmatist and the Feminist’”]. See also Charlene Haddock Seigfried, 
Reweaving the Social Fabric — Pragmatism and Feminism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1996) [hereinafter “Reweaving the Social Fabric”]; Catharine Pierce Wells, “Why Pragmatism 
Works for Me” (2000) 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 347; Mari Matsuda, “Pragmatism Modified and the False 
Consciousness Problem” (1990) 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1763 [hereinafter “‘Pragmatism Modified’”]; 
Richard Rorty, “Feminism and Pragmatism” (1991) 30 Mich. Q. Rev. 231 [hereinafter “Feminism 
and Pragmatism”]; and Jane Duran, “The Intersection of Pragmatism and Feminism” (1993) 8:2 
Hypatia 159. For an example of early scholarship reflective of feminist pragmatism, see Jane 
Addams, Democracy and Social Ethics (Chicago: University of Illinois, reprinted in 2002). 
2
 According to biographer Ellen Anderson in Judging Bertha Wilson: Law as Large as 
Life (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) [hereinafter “Judging Bertha Wilson”], Justice 
Wilson did not identify herself as a feminist. Her judgments and speeches, however, reveal a 
consistent and deep concern with advancing women’s rights, a concern at the heart of the feminist 
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Justice Wilson’s pragmatism was refracted through a lens of 
feminism. It was not simply a matter of making decisions that were 
practical within the parameters of current institutional and social 
conditions. It was a matter of making decisions that respected and 
advanced the equality of women and other socially disadvantaged groups 
while operating within the constraints of the rule of law and respecting 
the institutional limits on the role of judges. Understanding Justice 
Wilson’s contributions through the lens of feminist pragmatism helps to 
deepen our understanding of some of the most innovative aspects of her 
legal reasoning. In this article, three dimensions of pragmatist thought 
are examined which are particularly significant for feminist theory and 
which are evident in the work of Justice Wilson. These include the 
commitment to making choices that have normative consequences while 
acknowledging the practical obstacles of an imperfect world, 
endorsement of an interpretative approach rooted in the contextual 
realities of everyday life, and a belief in the provisional and dynamic 
nature of truth.  
II. THE DOUBLE BIND — MAKING CHOICES IN 
AN IMPERFECT WORLD 
A useful starting point for exploring the theoretical intersections 
between pragmatism and feminism in relation to law is Margaret Radin’s 
influential article, “The Pragmatist and the Feminist”.3 Professor Radin’s 
interest in feminism and pragmatism emerged during her study of legal 
issues relating to surrogacy, prostitution and marital contracting. In these 
domains, Radin observes that the commodification of women’s repro-
ductive and sexual capacities risks accentuating exploitation and 
oppression. At the same time, she acknowledges that legal prohibitions 
on commodification threaten to undermine women’s autonomy and in 
some cases their economic survival. Radin recognizes, therefore, that 
either dichotomous policy choice — for example, allowing contracts that 
commodify women’s bodies or prohibiting such contracts — may be 
harmful “under current social conditions”.4 Yet, often either-or choices 
are the only ones available in the short term. She labels this dilemma the 
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“double bind”.5 Feminist pragmatists, therefore, recognize that “an 
outcome along ideal dimensions may leave individuals without a 
remedy”.6 
Understanding the double bind problem arises from consciousness of 
a duality between an ideal feminist analysis of gender equality and the 
actual effects of legal and policy choices in the context of present-day 
realities and constraints for women living in a non-ideal world. Imposing 
legal and policy choices premised on de-contextualized ideals of gender 
equality may impose significant harms on women given the immediate 
options and choices they have under existing social, economic and 
political conditions. Radin suggests that we “must look carefully at the 
non-ideal circumstances in each case and decide which horn of the 
dilemma is better (or less bad), and we must keep re-deciding as time 
goes on”.7 Rather than seeking a solution that resolves the double bind 
(an impossible task in the short term), Radin advocates choosing “the 
alternative that will hinder empowerment the least and further it the 
most”.8 Thus feminist pragmatism provides a theoretical framework for 
understanding the logic of decision-making in contexts of constrained 
and non-ideal choices.  
Feminist judges are routinely confronted with the dilemma of the 
double bind. Because judging occurs in a non-ideal world, they 
recognize that ideal and principled outcomes may not be possible in the 
face of existing social and economic conditions. However, they still 
believe in the broader ideals, resulting in the experience of the double 
bind. In an important speech about women judges, “Will Women Judges 
Really Make a Difference?”, Justice Wilson began by articulating her 
concerns about the expectations that women in Canada had regarding her 
appointment as the first woman on the Supreme Court. Though many 
heralded what they called “a new era for women”, Justice Wilson asks: 
“So why was I not rejoicing? Why did I not share the tremendous 
confidence of these women?”9 She states: 
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86 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
… I knew from hard experience that the law does not work that way. 
Change in law comes slowly and incrementally; that is its nature. It 
responds to changes in society; it seldom initiates them. And while I 
was prepared — and, indeed, as a woman judge, anxious — to respond 
to these changes, I wondered to what extent I would be constrained in 
my attempts to do so by the nature of judicial office itself.10 
Justice Wilson was sensitive to the limits of adjudication as a 
pathway to social change and, as explored further below, articulated 
various versions of the double bind problem in her judgments. 
Nonetheless, she was not afraid to challenge traditional frameworks and 
expand conventional legal categories as a means of moving forward, 
albeit haltingly and in complex ways, towards a more inclusive and 
egalitarian vision of legal rights and obligations.  
Justice Wilson’s pragmatic acceptance of the non-ideal conditions in 
which law operates is revealed in her approach to judging in a number of 
different contexts. In one of her most significant decisions while at the 
Supreme Court of Canada, R. v. Lavallee,11 Justice Wilson acknowledged 
the importance of understanding the defence of self-defence in light of 
the lived realities of conjugal violence. Her judgment gave voice to 
societal condemnation of domestic violence: 
The gravity, indeed, the tragedy of domestic violence can hardly be 
overstated. Greater media attention to this phenomenon in recent years 
has revealed both its prevalence and its horrific impact on women from 
all walks of life. Far from protecting women from it the law 
historically sanctioned the abuse of women within marriage as an 
aspect of the husband’s ownership of his wife and his “right” to 
chastise her.12  
She then endeavoured to elaborate the law of self-defence, insisting 
that the jury consider emerging expert knowledge about the realities of 
domestic abuse in assessing whether the accused had both a reasonable 
apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm and a genuine belief that 
escape was impossible. While Justice Wilson recognized that it is clearly 
preferable for abused women to leave violent relationships instead of 
resorting to spousal homicide, she nevertheless insisted that the law be 
attentive to the constrained choices and desperation abused women live. 
In a speech about domestic violence delivered just after her retirement 
                                                                                                             
10
 Id., at 13. 
11
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from the Supreme Court in 1991, and shortly after the Lavallee decision, 
Justice Wilson maintained that violence against women in the family 
will continue to occur until women “are recognized as equal, respected, 
and involved partners by the society at large and the institutions which 
comprise it”.13 For Justice Wilson, the ideal solution to domestic abuse 
was integrally connected to the larger struggle for gender equality. In the 
absence of such ideal conditions, however, her judicial decisions 
reflected a willingness to endeavour to decide cases based on the 
practical realities of societal inequality. 
Beyond the context of domestic violence, Justice Wilson’s 
judgments in a wide range of areas repeatedly attest to the necessity of 
making difficult either-or decisions when neither option is ideal. For 
example, in a trilogy of cases involving the rights of prostitutes, Justice 
Wilson recognized that there were no ideal solutions proffered by law. In 
her dissenting reasons, striking down Criminal Code14 prohibitions on 
sexual solicitation, she chose to uphold the rights of prostitutes to 
freedom of expression: 
While it is an undeniable fact that many people find the idea of 
exchanging sex for money offensive and immoral, it is also a fact that 
many types of conduct which are subject to widespread disapproval 
and allegations of immorality have not been criminalized. Indeed, one 
can think of a number of reasons why selling sex has not been made a 
criminal offence … more often than not the real “victim” of 
prostitution is the prostitute himself or herself. Sending prostitutes to 
prison for their conduct may therefore be viewed by legislators as an 
unsuitable response to the phenomenon.15 
Justice Wilson’s sensitivity to the need to move forward in an 
imperfect world, in domains which were of critical importance in 
women’s lives, informed the methodological dimensions of her approach 
to judging.  
With respect to abortion rights, her path-breaking concurring 
judgment in Morgentaler affirmed a woman’s right to decide whether or 
not to terminate an unwanted pregnancy as a dimension of her 
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 Bertha Wilson, “Family Violence” (An Address to the National Convention of B’nai 
Brith Women of Canada, May 26, 1991), (1992) 5 Can J. of Women & L. 137, at 141 [hereinafter 
“Family Violence”]. 
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 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
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 Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c ) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52, 
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entitlement to both liberty and security of the person.16 In so doing, she 
acknowledges that a woman’s decision about abortion is a difficult one 
“that will have profound psychological, economic and social 
consequences for the pregnant woman”.17 She continues:  
... The circumstances giving rise to it can be complex and varied and 
there may be, and usually are, powerful considerations militating in 
opposite directions. It is a decision that deeply reflects the way the 
woman thinks about herself and her relationship to others and to 
society at large. It is not just a medical decision; it is a profound social 
and ethical one as well. Her response to it will be the response of the 
whole person.18 
Recognition of the situational complexities of the dilemma of 
abortion resonates with pragmatism. Justice Wilson then proceeds to 
affirm women’s constitutional right to make that complex decision — 
recognizing that its ethical and legal dimensions cannot be abstracted 
from the contextual realities of women’s lives. While affirming women’s 
constitutional rights and freedoms, Justice Wilson also recognizes the 
existence of countervailing and legitimate interests in the protection of 
the foetus “at the later stages of [a woman’s] pregnancy when the state’s 
compelling interest in the protection of the foetus would justify it in 
prescribing conditions”.19 Thus, she again demonstrates a resistance to 
absolutist outcomes, based on abstract principles. Instead, she recognizes 
that women’s rights may yield to countervailing concerns depending on 
the conditions and circumstances. 
In the domain of family law, she also demonstrated a willingness to 
make decisions in contexts where neither choice was ideal. In a widely 
criticized decision, Racine v. Woods,20 she accorded custody via a de 
facto adoption process to the foster parents of a young Aboriginal girl. In 
rejecting the Aboriginal biological mother’s claim for custody, Justice 
Wilson states that the decision was difficult given the dual concerns with 
Aboriginal cultural heritage and parent-child bonding as dimensions of 
the best interest of the child. Still, she accepted the view that a decision 
should be made rather than leaving the child’s family status in limbo. 
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 R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Morgentaler”]. 
17
 Id., at 171. 
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 Id., at 183. 
20
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She thus notes the need to “bite the bullet”21 and decide. In so doing, she 
upholds the de facto adoption claim of the foster parents on the grounds 
that the child had bonded with her foster parents during the biological 
mother’s three-year absence. 
... In my view, when the test to be met is the best interests of the child, 
the significance of cultural background and heritage as opposed to 
bonding abates over time. The closer the bond that develops with the 
prospective adoptive parents the less important the racial element 
becomes.22  
Justice Wilson demonstrates a willingness to make a choice despite 
conflicting concerns and risks of harm regardless of which choice was 
made. Nevertheless, she was criticized for the ways in which her 
decision reinforced systemic racism against Aboriginal people in the 
child welfare system and for her failure to appreciate the significant 
efforts made by the biological mother to remake her life.23  
Justice Wilson was also criticized for her decision in a trilogy of 
cases dealing with spousal support.24 In all three cases, she denied 
spousal support to economically needy wives — prompting criticism 
from feminist legal scholars about her failure to be adequately attentive 
to the economic consequences of marriage on women.25 Justice Wilson’s 
reasoning engaged with a number of conflicting policy concerns and 
principles. She endorsed the idea of freedom of contract, spousal 
compensation for economic dependence causally connected to marriage, 
the importance of allowing individuals to terminate once and for all the 
bonds of marriage, and state responsibility for economic well-being. In 
an effort to take these divergent and sometimes conflicting principles 
into account, she crafted her “causal connection” test — which limited 
spousal support obligations to cases where the current economic need of 
the former spouse was foreseeable and causally connected to the 
                                                                                                             
21
 Id., at 187. 
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 Id., at 187-88. 
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 Patricia A. Monture, “A Vicious Circle: Child Welfare and the First Nations” (1989) 3 
C.J.W.L. 1, at 12-14.  
24
 See Pelech v. Pelech, [1987] S.C.J. No. 31, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 801 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Pelech”]; Richardson v. Richardson, [1987] S.C.J. No. 30, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 857 (S.C.C.); Caron v. 
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Fam. L. 95. 
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marriage relationship.26 In applying this framework to the specific factual 
circumstances of the trilogy of cases before the Court, she concluded 
that the economic need of the three wives seeking spousal support was 
not causally connected to their previous marriages, and thus denied their 
claims.  
In a speech about family law a few years after her decisions in the 
trilogy, Justice Wilson appears to recognize that perhaps the Court did 
not adequately take into account the extended effects of economic 
disadvantage linked to marriage.27 Nevertheless, the idea of basing 
economic obligations between spouses on some form of compensatory 
rationale that uses the logic of the causal connection test has been 
endorsed in other contexts, most notably the widely praised constructive 
trust cases involving common law couples.28 Moreover, Justice Wilson’s 
support for a more robust public responsibility for economic well-being, 
and resistance to the logic of the privatization of economic 
responsibilities, has been reclaimed as an important and yet often 
overlooked aspect of the spousal support trilogy.29  
III. KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE: CONTEXTUAL APPROACHES  
It is so much easier to come up with a black and white answer if you 
are unencumbered by a broader context which might prompt you … to 
temper the cold light of reason with the warmer tints of imagination 
and sympathy.30 
Faced with the recognition that we do not live in an ideal world — 
that moral, ethical, legal choices operate in the complex, messy, 
compromised contexts of everyday life, Justice Wilson advocated the 
need to adopt a contextual approach to legal reasoning. According to 
Justice Wilson, a contextual approach “recognizes that a particular right 
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 Pelech, supra, note 24, at 851-52. This test appears to have been inspired by the 
constructive trust cases which relied on the causal connection concept to determine equitable 
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 Bertha Wilson, “Women, the Family, and the Constitutional Protection of Privacy” (1992) 
17 Queen’s L.J. 5, at 16-17 [hereinafter “Women, the Family”].  
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 See, e.g., Pettkus v. Becker, [1978] O.J. No. 3398, 87 D.L.R. (3d) 101 (Ont. C.A.) per 
Wilson J.A., affd [1980] S.C.J. No. 103, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834 (S.C.C.). 
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 See Robert Leckey, “What Is Left of Pelech?” (2008) 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 103. 
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or freedom may have a different value depending on the context”.31 In an 
important concurring opinion regarding the interpretation of the section 
1 balancing provisions in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
Justice Wilson notes: 
... The contextual approach attempts to bring into sharp relief the 
aspect of the right or freedom which is truly at stake in the case as well 
as the relevant aspects of any values in competition with it. It seems to 
be more sensitive to the reality of the dilemma posed by the particular 
facts and therefore more conducive to finding a fair and just 
compromise between the two competing values under s. 1.32 
The contextual approach is prevalent throughout Justice Wilson’s 
judgments and writings. To cite another example from her speech on 
constitutional law, family law and privacy, Justice Wilson writes: 
Real lives, contemporary women’s lives should not only be taken 
seriously but should be regarded as primary in interpreting 
constitutional guarantees which impact directly or indirectly on 
women’s equality. Experiences must not be “shoehorned” to fit within 
the constitutional guarantees: rather, the constitutional guarantees must 
be interpreted in a way that is responsive to women’s reality.33 
Justice Wilson championed a contextual methodology, linking it to a 
purposive approach that is consistent with the rejection of an originalist 
or frozen rights approach and reflective of a vision of the Constitution as 
a “living tree”.34 For Justice Wilson, a contextual approach engages 
judges in an assessment of the lived realities of individuals, historical 
understandings of legal categories and concepts and modern social 
conditions. 
This insistence on linking law to the myriad complex contexts of 
modern social life finds important parallels in pragmatist philosophy. As 
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 Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 124, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 
1326, at 1355-56 (S.C.C.). 
32
 Id. The appellant in the case sought a declaration that statutory provisions prohibiting the 
publication of personal details in matrimonial proceedings contravene, in part, the right to freedom 
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Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 
1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
33
 “Women, the Family”, supra, note 27, at 13. 
34
 Id., at 8 and 29.  
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John Dewey noted, “neglect of context is the greatest single disaster 
which philosophic thinking can incur”.35 As a critical contributor to 
pragmatist philosophy in the United States, Dewey’s ideas underscore 
the need to ground theory in practice and experiential knowledge. As 
Shannon Sullivan explains, Dewey used the term “transaction” to denote 
the “dynamic, co-constitutive relationship” between individuals and their 
environment.36 A recurrent theme in pragmatist philosophy is a concern 
with actual concrete contexts rather than abstract, universal principles 
and concepts.37 As Sullivan suggests, “… pragmatism’s emphasis on 
concrete particulars of ‘real’ life, instead of abstractions … lend it to 
feminist discourse”.38 
Yet, pragmatist contextualism in and of itself does not provide an 
adequate account of Justice Wilson’s judicial philosophy. Justice 
Wilson’s pragmatic turn to real life contexts and perspectives was deeply 
embedded in a concern with the effects of law on socially disadvantaged 
and disempowered groups, including women. Informing legal rights and 
obligations with the contextual realities of those who have been 
excluded from historical processes of defining legal concepts and 
categories was central to Justice Wilson’s contextual methodology. It is 
this aspect of Wilson’s interpretive methodology that resonates with 
feminist theory, particularly feminist standpoint theory. A central 
premise of feminist standpoint theory is the importance of “‘starting off 
thought’ from the lives of marginalized peoples” in order to “generate 
less partial and distorted accounts, not only of women’s lives, but also of 
men’s lives and of the whole social order”.39 Justice Wilson’s approach 
also parallels what Mari Matsuda calls a “weighted pragmatic method” 
— an approach that actively seeks “to retrieve subordinated voices in 
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 John Dewey, “Context and Thought” in Jo Ann Boydston, ed., The Later Works of John 
Dewey, 1925-1953, vol. 6 (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981-
1990), at 11, cited in Reweaving the Social Fabric, supra, note 1, at 38.  
36
 Shannon Sullivan, Living Across and Through Skins: Transactional Bodies, Pragmatism 
and Feminism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), at 1 [hereinafter “Living Across and 
Through Skins”]. 
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 Nancy Levit & Robert R.M. Verchick, Feminist Legal Theory: A Primer (New York: 
New York University Press, 2006), at 11-12. 
38
 Living Across and Through Skins, supra, note 36, at 5. Though such an orientation 
resonates with the legal realist approach to interpretation, unlike many legal realist scholars, 
pragmatists did not seek to find an objective truth through empirical analysis — or objectively 
correct legal concepts and meanings. 
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 Sandra Harding, “Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: ‘What is Strong Objectivity?’” 
in Linda Alcoff & Elizabeth Potter, eds., Feminist Epistemologies (New York: Routledge, 1993) 49, 
at 56. 
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order to attain a truer account of social reality and human possibilities”.40 
A number of scholars who endorse pragmatic approaches have also 
focused on seeking to “grasp the world from the perspective of the 
dominated, to hear the outsiders who have been silent and are now trying 
to speak … [and] allow … the developing perspectives of the oppressed 
to infiltrate the dominant institutional coherence”.41 Indeed, most 
poignantly, Robert Cover’s important idea of nomos — the regenerative 
interpretive authority of the oppressed — resonates with a pragmatism 
that encourages resistance and reinterpretations of dominant hegemonic 
understandings of the world from the perspective of the powerless.42  
Such a modified or critical contextualism is important to ensuring 
that pragmatic approaches do not use the status quo in a world of 
systemic and structural inequality to define that which ought to be. In 
other words, traditional pragmatism may provide justifications and 
legitimation to conventional understandings of the world, rooted in 
present-day social and institutional constraints. Catharine MacKinnon 
has alluded to the tendency in law to define as “reasonable” that which 
currently is practicable and possible within the prevailing status quo.43 
Radin explains that pragmatism can reinforce conservative world views 
to the extent that an “unenlightened, complacent pragmatist tends to 
argue that since ‘truth’ about the world is found in conceptual coherence, 
legal ‘truth’ should be discerned by reference to institutional 
coherence”.44 This conservative risk of traditional pragmatism reinforces 
the importance of developing a feminist pragmatist lens.  
Justice Wilson’s approach reflects a deep commitment to 
understanding the world from the perspective of those who have been 
excluded and socially disadvantaged in society. For example, in a 
remarkable passage in Morgentaler, Justice Wilson demonstrates her 
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 “Pragmatism Modified” (1990) 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1763, at 1768. See also Hilary 
Putnam, “A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy” (1989) 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1681. 
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Lives: Eight Resources for Maximizing Objectivity” (1990) 21:2-3 Journal of Social Philosophy 
140. 
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 Robert Cover, “Violence and the Word” (1986) 95 Yale L.J. 1601. 
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 Catharine MacKinnon, “Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State — Towards 
Feminist Jurisprudence” in Sandra Harding, ed., Feminism and Methodology (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1987) 135-56, at 141.  
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profound respect for the experiential knowledge of women faced with a 
decision about whether to terminate a pregnancy. 
… It is probably impossible for a man to respond, even imaginatively, 
to such a dilemma not just because it is outside the realm of his 
personal experience (although this is, of course, the case) but because 
he can relate to it only by objectifying it, thereby eliminating the 
subjective elements of the female psyche which are at the heart of the 
dilemma.45  
Her comments reflect a deep respect for deferring to the choices made by 
those who live the dilemma of abortion, with all of its moral and ethical 
complexities.  
In a similar vein, Justice Wilson’s decision in Lavallee interprets the 
meaning of self-defence in criminal law on the basis of abused women’s 
experiential knowledge 
… If it strains credulity to imagine what the “ordinary man” would do 
in the position of a battered spouse, it is probably because men do not 
typically find themselves in that situation. Some women do, however. 
The definition of what is reasonable must be adapted to circumstances 
which are, by and large, foreign to a world inhabited by the 
hypothetical “reasonable man”.46  
The traditional legal standard for reasonableness linked to the mythical 
“ordinary man” is displaced in favour of an appreciation of the 
specificity of the lives of abused and battered women. Hester Lessard 
also highlights Justice Wilson’s focus on social context and 
“attentiveness to detail in the stories of the central actors” in assessing 
reasonableness.47 In Lavallee, for example, Lessard notes that “the 
suggestion that it was reasonable for Lyn Lavallee to defend herself by 
shooting Kevin Rust as he left the room is supported by a detailed 
account of Lavallee’s actual situation as well as an exploration of the 
social phenomenon of male violence towards women”.48  
Another striking example of Justice Wilson’s willingness to listen to 
the experiential knowledge of women, even when it diverges from 
socially accepted norms, is found in a speech she delivered on violence 
against women. She laments the inadequacy of the legal system in 
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responding to problems of domestic violence and then concludes her 
speech with the words of an abused woman, who, after calling the police 
ended up losing her children, being divorced by her husband and being 
economically destitute and on welfare: 
These are her anguished words: 
Why did I ever call the police? They took my family, my home, my 
security, my dignity, and my belief in what is right. I would rather 
be beaten every day of my life by my husband than have a bunch of 
strangers take my life away without ever asking. 
Let us hope that the decade of the nineties will bring an end to the 
brutal face of inequality.49 
What is remarkable about this excerpt is its honouring of the experiential 
knowledge of women, even when that knowledge is diametrically 
opposed to common conceptions about gender equality and necessary 
legal responses to conjugal violence. It demonstrates Justice Wilson’s 
deep commitment to listening to what women say about the concrete 
effects of law on their daily lives, taking them seriously in her reflections 
on the justice system and amplifying them in her capacity as a public 
figure and judge.  
Taking the experiential realities of socially disadvantaged and 
disempowered groups seriously as a starting point for legal interpretation 
resulted in a willingness both to question fundamental conceptual 
categories in law and to begin their creative reconceptualization. For 
example, in a speech on the concept of privacy in constitutional law, she 
asks: 
What can we learn when we ask ourselves what is it like to experience 
life as a woman? The main thing we learn, I believe, is that for women 
the distinction between public and private life is unreal.50 
Her response reveals a willingness to challenge fundamental dimensions 
of conventional legal thought — the basic distinction between the public 
and private spheres. Moreover, Justice Wilson went further than critique, 
relying on experiential knowledge in her efforts to reformulate legal 
categories and rights — “to adapt doctrine, notwithstanding its historical 
roots, to contemporary reality and in particular to ensure that it serves all 
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the people, women as well as men”.51 Justice Wilson’s defiance of 
convention and willingness to articulate new approaches to law 
distinguished her from her fellow judges in some key instances — with 
the result that a few of her most creative and memorable judgments were 
hers alone — sole dissenting decisions or concurring opinions.52  
IV. THE PLURALITY OF TRUTH — PROVISIONAL CLAIMS 
AND CONTINUING CHANGE 
A third theme that demonstrates the resonance between Justice 
Wilson’s ideas and pragmatist thought is her open acceptance of the 
provisional, dynamic and tentative nature of legal categories and 
concepts. As Radin emphasizes, “pragmatism recommends that we take 
our present descriptions with humility and openness, and accept their 
institutional embodiments as provisional and incompletely entrenched”.53 
As John Dewey wrote, “Truth is a collection of truths; and these 
constituent truths are in the keeping of the best available methods of 
inquiry and testing as to matters-of-fact.”54 In what has been called 
neopragmatism, Richard Rorty affirms the importance of “courage and 
imagination rather than putatively neutral criteria”.55  
In reflecting on the significance of pragmatist theory to feminism, 
Rorty heralds feminist scholars who resist “ahistoric realism”56 and do 
not endeavour to “develop a non-hegemonic discourse, where truth is no 
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longer connected to power”. In Rorty’s view, it is impossible to “do 
away with social constructs in order to find something that is not a social 
construct”. Instead, he endorses feminist theory which is engaged in 
imagining new ways of being by appealing to “dimly imagined future 
practice”.57 Rorty’s ideas on feminism and pragmatism highlight a 
critical source of divergence in feminist thought. While some feminist 
scholars seek to heighten or attain objectivity by including the 
perspectives and experiential knowledge of women and other socially 
disadvantaged groups, other feminist theorists reject the idea of objective 
knowledge. For many feminist scholars, all knowledge is socially 
constructed and intimately linked to one’s power and position in 
society.58 Feminist pragmatism embraces this vision of provisional and 
tentative knowledge, that is constantly tested and evolving in a changing 
world.  
Justice Wilson’s approach embodied the important pragmatist insight 
that “truth is inevitably plural, concrete, and provisional”.59 While it is no 
doubt true that virtually all legal theorists and lawyers understand that law 
is dynamic and continually evolving over time, the traditions of legal 
formalism still provide an important counterweight — insisting that law is 
separate from politics, that law is objective, and that we must strive for 
certainty and longevity in the definition of legal rights and principles. 
Justice Wilson defied conventional legal thinking and repeatedly 
articulated the need both to question past definitions and concepts and to 
innovate by bringing fresh perspectives and approaches to law. Moreover, 
she recognized that her innovations were works-in-progress that would in 
turn be challenged, revised, and enlarged. In her speech, “Will Women 
Judges Really Make a Difference?”, Justice Wilson commented that “… 
there is no reason why the judiciary cannot exercise some modest degree 
of creativity in areas where modern insights and life’s experience have 
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indicated that the law has gone awry”.60 In some cases, however, what she 
viewed as a “modest degree of creativity” was seen by others as ushering 
in major shifts in law, reflecting (depending on the observer) either a 
much needed or unwarranted exercise of judicial power.61 For Justice 
Wilson, however, it was not a matter of fitting into any particular political 
or social agenda, but rather developing the law in a way that was humane 
and principled, while attentive to glaring social and economic inequities 
and systemic patterns of disadvantage.  
In the Morgentaler case, for example, she cites Noreen Burrows for 
her argument that the development of human rights began with a 
“history of men struggling to assert their dignity and common humanity 
against an overbearing state apparatus”.62 More recently, it is suggested 
that women sought “to eliminate discrimination, to achieve a place for 
women in a man’s world, to develop a set of legislative reforms in order 
to place women in the same position as men”.63 What is still emerging, 
according to Justice Wilson, is the process of defining “the rights of 
women in relation to their special place in the societal structure and in 
relation to the biological distinction between the two sexes”.64 She 
endorses therefore a dynamic vision of legal and human rights: 
... Thus, women’s needs and aspirations are only now being translated 
into protected rights. The right to reproduce or not to reproduce which 
is in issue in this case is one such right and is properly perceived as an 
integral part of modern woman’s struggle to assert her dignity and 
worth as a human being.65 
In Morgentaler, Justice Wilson’s willingness to interpret constitutional 
liberty as encompassing a woman’s right to make fundamental choices 
about when and whether to have children constituted a landmark 
innovation in Canadian law. 
Another particularly interesting example is Justice Wilson’s idea that 
the content and meaning of a constitutional minority language right 
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could grow over time as society changes. Usually, judges emphasize the 
universal and timeless quality of fundamental rights and freedoms. In 
Assn. of Parents for Fairness in Education, Grand Falls District 50 
Branch v. Société des Acadiens du Nouveau-Brunswick Inc.,66 a case 
involving minority language rights in New Brunswick, Justice Wilson 
endorses the underlying principle of equality between French and 
English.67 Drawing on the textual significance of the obligation to 
advance the equality of both official languages, she articulated a 
“principle of growth or development” in the constitutional minority 
language rights.68 The question judges should ask, according to Justice 
Wilson, “will always be — where are we currently on the road to 
bilingualism and is the impugned conduct in keeping with that stage of 
development?”69 Provided the government was acting in the “spirit of 
equality”, its actions could be judged constitutional even if they fell 
short of securing absolute equality. As Justice Wilson maintained, 
constitutional protections were not to be “perceived as static”.70 Rather, 
judges should interpret protections for linguistic duality in a way that 
was sensitive to “an escalating standard commensurate with the 
evolution of social expectations”.71 Justice Wilson was at ease with a 
fluid understanding of constitutional principles; yet, her principle of 
growth was not in sync with the views of the majority of the Court. Nor 
did it attract support from Chief Justice Dickson, who penned a separate 
dissenting judgment in the case. It stands, nonetheless, as a testament to 
her creativity in judicial interpretation and to her belief in open 
acknowledgement of the dynamic nature of legal concepts, and the 
importance of their continued evolution in light of social change. 
Justice Wilson’s dynamic understanding of the law and the 
importance of its continued evolution was not limited to the domain of 
constitutional and public law. An important example of her willingness 
to interpret the common law principles of tort law in an innovative and 
creative way is her decision as a judge at the Ontario Court of Appeal in 
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Bhadauria v. Seneca College of Applied Arts and Technology.72 The case 
involved allegations of discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin by an 
East Indian woman seeking employment as a teacher at Seneca College. 
Rather than filing a human rights complaint under the Ontario Human 
Rights Code, she initiated a court action, seeking damages for 
discrimination, including economic loss and “mental distress, frustration 
and loss of dignity and self-esteem”.73 In concluding that there was an 
independent tort of discrimination at common law, Justice Wilson traced 
the evolving jurisprudence on the intersection between freedom of 
contract, property rights, public policy and discrimination. She found the 
decision in Re Drummond Wren to be very persuasive because the Court 
based its decision to strike down a discriminatory restrictive covenant on 
the grounds of public policy.74 As Justice MacKay affirmed in Re 
Drummond Wren, citing Halsburys, “what is public policy ‘varies from 
time to time’: the principles remain the same but they may be applied in 
novel ways”.75 Justice Wilson further quoted from Prosser’s classic 
Handbook on the Law of Torts, where he affirms that the “law of torts is 
anything but static, and the limits of development are never set”.76 For 
Justice Wilson, the novelty of a legal claim does not preclude its 
recognition. With these principles in mind, Justice Wilson turns to the 
preamble to the Ontario Human Rights Code77 and gleans from it 
evidence of prevailing public policy regarding the fundamental 
importance of equality and non-discrimination. She then relies on this 
endorsement of equality to ground recognition of a common law tort of 
discrimination. While it is true that there is widespread acknowledgment 
of the dynamic nature of the common law, Justice Wilson demonstrated 
a greater willingness than many judges to read new rights and 
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obligations into the common law — insisting that it respond to changing 
social realities.  
V. CONCLUSION 
If women lawyers and women judges through their differing 
perspectives on life can bring a new humanity to bear on the decision-
making process, perhaps they will make a difference. Perhaps they will 
succeed in infusing the law with an understanding of what it means to 
be fully human.78 
Justice Wilson may have hesitated to situate herself within the 
parameters of any social movement or philosophical tradition. 
Nevertheless, recognizing the ways in which her approach to judging 
incorporated critical components of both feminism and pragmatism 
provides new sources of insight into her judicial contributions. Drawing 
on the attentiveness to context and constrained social realities in 
pragmatist philosophy and the commitments to equality at the heart of 
feminist theory provides us with a broader theoretical foundation for 
comprehending the logic of her decision-making. Her judgments reveal 
the willingness to make tangible and immediate decisions while 
acknowledging that ideal outcomes are often impossible in the face of 
non-ideal conditions and constraints. This awareness of the imperfect 
choices at the heart of judging prompted her to insist that we be vigilant 
in continuing to question, to reconsider, to seek to develop the law to 
create and recreate moments of justice in a constantly changing world. 
She insisted, moreover, in informing law with a contextual appreciation 
of social and economic realities. We may not agree with the decisions 
she made in every case; we may think that she was mistaken or 
misunderstood the litigants’ lives or needs in some cases. Still Justice 
Wilson had the courage to act, to decide, and to articulate her dynamic 
and contextual vision of law.  
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